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Abstract. Recently, data-dependent permutations (DDP) that are very suitable
for intelligent multimedia and ubiquitous computing systems have been introduced
as a new cryptographic primitive for the design of fast encryption systems. The
CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H block ciphers are the typical examples of DDP-based
encryption algorithms. In this paper, we show that CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H are
vulnerable to related-key differential attacks. We first describe how to construct
their full-round related-key differential characteristics with high probabilities and
then we exploit them to break the full-round CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H with 244,
and 248 data/time complexities, respectively.
Keywords: Intelligent multimedia and ubiquitous computing systems, encryption
algorithms, CIKS-128, CIKS-128H, related-key differential characteristics
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most important issues in the field of intelligent multimedia and ubiquitous
computing systems is on how to protect sensitive data and how to offer data and
entity authentications. The most common method to solve this security problem
is to use encryption algorithms such as block ciphers, stream ciphers and public-
key ciphers. However, the intelligent multimedia and ubiquitous computing systems
require low power devices with high speeds, which implies that light and efficient
encryption algorithms can only be used in such systems.
Recently, data-dependent permutations (DDP), which can be easily embedded
in microcontrollers and general purpose CPUs, have been introduced as one of cryp-
tographic primitives suitable to attain such a goal. Several DDP-based ciphers have
been proposed for hardware implementation with low cost, such as CIKS-1 [17],
SPECTR-H64 [3], and Cobra-S128 [5]. Since all of them use very simple key sche-
dules in order to have no time consuming key preprocessing, they are suitable for
the applications of many networks requiring high speed encryption in the case of
frequent change of keys. Actually, they are competitive with the other well used
encryption algorithms, such as AES, for different variants of hardware implementa-
tion [19, 21].
However, they have two fatal weaknesses in security. One is that the CP (con-
trolled permutation) boxes, which are a sort of the DDP, are cryptographic linear
primitives in which there exists the linearity of the sum of their output bits. By
using this property [13] resulted in a linear attack on CIKS-1 faster than exhaustive
search. Nevertheless, most of the DDP-based ciphers are secure against linear crypt-
analysis due to the use of additional components with small non-linearity. The other
is simply designed key scheduling algorithms, which make the cryptanalysts apply
the related-key attack easily to such kinds of block ciphers [10, 11, 14]. Indeed, the
related-key attack is one of useful tools for evaluating the security of block ciphers.
Though it is hard to mount in general, this kind of attack can be practical in some of
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the current real-world applications such as the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor [22], PGV-
type hash functions, message authentication codes, recent authenticated encryption
modes [23], cases of key-exchange protocols that do not guarantee key integrity, and
key-update protocols that update session keys using a known function [8].
CIKS-128 [3] and CIKS-128H [20], which are the improved versions of CIKS-1
and SPECTR-H64 [4], are 128-bit block ciphers with a 256-bit key size. Specially,
CIKS-128H uses non-linear controlled elements (NCE) instead of CP boxes in order
to be free of any linearity. These ciphers also have better hardware implementations
(FPGA and ASIC) than other ciphers used in security layers of most of wireless
protocols, WAP, OMA, UMTS, IEEE 802.11 and so on.
In this paper, we first present the structural properties of the controlled permu-
tations used in the round functions of two ciphers, which allow us to make full-round
related-key differential characteristics with high probabilities. We then present new
related-key differential attacks on the full-round CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H which
require about 244 and 248 data/time complexities, respectively. Our attacks correct
and improve the results in [11].1 Table 1 summarizes our results.
Block Number of Complexity
Cipher Rounds Data/Time
CIKS-128 12 (full) 244RK-CP/244
CIKS-128H 8 (full) 248RK-CP/248
RK-CP: Related-Key Chosen Plaintexts, Time: Encryption units
Table 1. Summary of our related-key differential attacks on CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly present how the
related-key differential attack works in block ciphers. Section 3 describes two block
ciphers CIKS-128, CIKS-128H, and Section 4 gives their structural properties. Sec-
tions 5 and 6 present related-key differential characteristics and key recovery attacks
of CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H, respectively. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2 THE RELATED-KEY DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK
The related-key differential attack was firstly introduced in 1992 by Knudsen [12],
and it was later formalized and generalized in 1993 by Biham [1]. The attack method
applies differential cryptanalysis [2] to the cipher with different, but related unknown
keys. The key relation between the related keys is known to the attacker, but the
related keys themselves are not revealed. This attack is based on the key scheduling
algorithm and on the encryption/decryption algorithms, hence a cipher with a weak
key scheduling algorithm may be vulnerable to this kind of attack.
1 [11] presented two attacks on CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H which are composed of wrong
P−18/12 and R
−1
8/12, respectively, and thus they do not work. In this paper, we present new
attacks on the correct CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H.
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We assume that an n-bit block cipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is divided




K(P )), where P is an n-bit plaintext,
K is a k-bit secret key, and E0, Ef and E are all permutations on n bits for each
k-bit secret key. The related-key differential attack exploits a related-key differential





K⊕∆K(X ⊕ α) = β] = p > 2
−n,
where ∆K is a non-zero key difference chosen by the attacker. Then we can retrieve
the subkey of Ef as follows:
1. Collect about c · p−1 plaintext pairs (P, P ′) whose differences are all α, where
c > 1.
2. Obtain the corresponding ciphertext pairs (C,C ′) using the keys (K,K ⊕∆K).





′) = β, (1)
where Dfk = (E
f
k )
−1, Dfk⊕∆k = (E
f
k⊕∆k)
−1 and ∆k is the subkey difference of Ef
derived from the key difference ∆K (if the key schedule is linear, then ∆k is
uniquely determined by ∆K). We denote this number by Tk. Output subkey k
as the right key of Ef if all Tk > Tk′ for subkey candidates k
′ ( 6= k).
If the subkey k is the right one, then about c ciphertext pairs are expected to
pass the β test (see Equation (1) for the β test) due to our assumed related-key
differential characteristic of E0. Otherwise, the expected number of ciphertext pairs
passing the β test is about c ·p−1 ·2−n, for the β test has an n-bit filtering condition.
Since p > 2−n, the expected number of suggested ciphertext pairs for each wrong
subkey is less than that for the right subkey. The success rate of this attack depends
on the constant c and the number of subkey candidates for Ef . If we exploit an
appropriate threshold to keep a portion of the subkey candidates for Ef instead of
outputting the subkey with the maximal number Tk of hits (for instance, in Step 3,
we can keep all the subkeys that suggest more than c/2 ciphertext pairs), then we
can sieve many of wrong subkeys for Ef with a higher success rate.2
3 DESCRIPTION OF CIKS-128 AND CIKS-128H
In this section, we first introduce some notations and controlled permutations which
are the components of CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H. Second, we give descriptions of
CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H.
2 In our attacks on CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H, we directly retrieve subkey bits of Ef
using ciphertext pairs remained after a filtration step, since all the filtered correspond-
ing plaintext pairs are expected to be right pairs following our related-key differential
characteristics. This is described it in Section 6.
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The following notations are used throughout the paper. A bit index will be
numbered from left to right, starting with bit 1. If P = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) then p1 is
the most significant bit and pn is the least significant bit.
• ei,j: a binary string in which the i
th and jth bits are one and the others are
zeroes, e.g., e1,3 = (1, 0, 1, . . . , 0).
• ⊕: bitwise-XOR operation
• ≪ (≫): left (right) cyclic rotation


















X=(x1 , x2 , ... , x8)
P2/1P2/1 P2/1P2/1
P4/4 P4/4
Y=(y1 , y2 , ... , y8)
X=(x1 , x2 , ... , x8)
P4/4 P4/4
P2/1P2/1 P2/1P2/1












V=(v1 , v2 , ... , vm)
Y= Pn/m(V) (X) =(y1 , y2 , ... , yn)




































Fig. 1. a) Pn/m, b) P2/1, c) P4/4, d) P
−1
4/4, e) P8/12, f) P
−1
8/12, h) P64/192, g) P
−1
64/192
The DDP can be performed with controlled permutation (CP) boxes, which are
defined as follows.
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Definition 1. Let F (X, V ) be a function F : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n. F is
called a CP-box, if F (X, V ) is a bijection for any fixed V .
We denote the above CP-box F (X, V ) by Pn/m, performing permutations on
n-bit binary vectors X depending on some controlling m-bit vector V . It is con-
structed by using switching elements P2/1 as elementary building blocks performing
controlled transposition of two input bits x1 and x2. The P2/1-box is controlled by
one bit v and outputs two bits y1 and y2, where y1 = x1+v and y2 = x2−v, i.e., if
v = 1, it swaps two input bits, otherwise (if v = 0), it does not.
The Pn/m-box can be represented as a superposition of the operations performed
on bit sets:
Pn/m = L
V1 ◦ π1 ◦ L
V2 ◦ π2 ◦ . . . ◦ πs−1 ◦ L
Vs (2)
where L is an active layer composed of n
2
P2/1 parallel elementary boxes, V1, V2, . . . , Vs
are controlling vectors of the active layers from 1 to s = 2m
n
, and π1, π2, . . . , πs−1
are fixed permutations (see Figure 1). Figure 1-(g) and -(h) show the structures
of P64/192 and P
−1
64/192)used in CIKS-128. Due to the symmetric structure and
the mutual inverses, Pn/m and P
−1
n/m differ only with the distribution of control-




64/192 are mutually inverse when
V = (V1, V2, . . . , V6) and V
′ = (V6, V5, . . . , V1), where |Vi| = 32 bits.
However, there exists a security problem in the use of the CP-boxes as a crypto-
graphic primitive, which is the linearity of the sum of all the input and output bits
of the CP-boxes. This property is defined by the linearity of the elementary building
block P2/1 : y1 + y2 = x1 + x2. In order to thwart this linearity of P2/1-box, new
non-linear controlled element (NCE), R2/1 has been proposed. It is also controlled
by one bit v and outputs two bits y1 and y2, where y1 = f1(x1, x2, v) = x1v⊕x2v⊕x2
and y2 = f1(x1, x2, v) = x2v⊕x1. Similarly, Rn/m are constructed as a superposition
of R2/1 like Equation (2). The only difference between Pn/m and Rn/m is the used
standard elementary box. The Rn/m and R
−1
n/m are used in the round function of
CIKS-128H.
We are now ready to describe the block ciphers CIKS-128 [3] and CIKS-
128H [20]. These ciphers use the same iterative structure and are composed of
the initial transformation (IT), e-dependent round function Crypt(e), and the final
transformation (FT) where e = 0 (e = 1) denotes encryption (decryption) mode as
follows:
1. An input block is divided into two subblocks L and R.
2. Perform initial transformation: L0 = L ⊕ O3 and R0 = R ⊕ O4, where O3 and
O4 are subkeys;
3. For j = 1 to r− 1 do: ◦ (Lj, Rj) := Crypt
(e)(Lj−1, Rj−1, Q
(e)
j ), where Q
(e)
j is the
jth round key; ◦ Swap the data subblocks: T = Rj, Rj = Lj , Lj = T ;
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5. Perform final transformation: CL = Lr ⊕ O1 and CR = Rr ⊕ O2, where O1
and O2 are subkeys;




























Fig. 2. Crypt(e) of CIKS-128
CIKS-128 [3] is the 12-round iterated block cipher with an 128-bit input and
a 256-bit secret key. The Crypt(e) used in CIKS-128 is composed of two fixed






(V ′) (see Figure 2).
Permutation Π contains four cycles of the length 16 represented as follows:
(1, 50, 9, 42, 17, 34, 25, 26, 33, 18, 41, 10, 49, 2, 57, 58)
(3, 64, 43, 24, 19, 48, 59, 8, 35, 32, 11, 56, 51, 16, 27, 40)
(4, 7, 28, 47, 52, 23, 12, 63, 36, 39, 60, 15, 20, 55, 44, 31)
(5, 14, 13, 6, 21, 62, 29, 54, 37, 46, 45, 38, 53, 30, 61, 22).
Another permutation π forms the control vectors V and V ′ using three 64-bit in-
put values for the P64/192 and P
−1
64/192-box respectively. Let us consider formation
of the vector V = (V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6) = π(L, L
′, L′′) where Vi(1 ≦ i ≦ 6) ∈
{0, 1}32, L = (l1, . . . , l64) ∈ {0, 1}
64: the left input of round function, (L′, L′′) =




1, . . . , l
′′
64)) ∈ {(L⊕A
(1), L⊕A(4)), (L⊕A(3), L⊕A(2))}, A(i)(1 ≦ i ≦
4) ∈ {0, 1}64: the round keys.
The correspondence between bits of the controlling vector V and elementary
switching boxes P2/1 of P
V
64/192-box is given in Table 2, where rows indicate active
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layers and numbers correspond to indices of the bits of L, L′, L′′. The rows corre-
sponding to vectors V1 and V4 indicate bits of L. The rows corresponding to vectors
V2 and V5 indicate bits of L
′. The rows corresponding to vectors V3 and V6 indicate
bits of L′′.
For example, according to the table, we have: V3 = (l
′′











l′′9), V4 = (l33, l34, . . . , l64). The vector V
′ is formatted in similar way.
The permutational involution I in one round between P64/192 and P
−1
64/192 is





5 , Y3 = X
≪4
4 , Y4 = X
≪4
3 , Y5 = X
≪4
2 , Y6 = X
≪4
1 , Y7 = X
≪4
8 , Y8 = X
≪4
7 .
The transformation G(L,A′, A′′) = W defining the operation G(A′,A′′)(L) is de-
scribed as follows:
W = L0 ⊕ A
′
0 ⊕ (L1 ∩ A
′′
0)⊕ (L2 ∩ L5)⊕ (L6 ∩ A
′
1)
⊕ (A′′1 ∩ A
′
2)⊕ (L4 ∩ L3)⊕ (L1 ∩ L6 ∩ L4)
⊕ (L2 ∩ L6 ∩ A
′′
1)⊕ (L1 ∩ A
′′
1 ∩ L2 ∩ L4),
where ∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, ∀j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 6}, the binary vectors Lj and Ai are defined
as: L0 = L, L1 = (1, l1, . . . , l63), . . ., Lj = (1, . . . , 1, l1, . . . , l64−j), A0 = A, A1 =
(1, a1, . . . , a63), A2 = (1, 1, a1, . . . , a62) (A = A
′ or A′′).
The additional box P
(e)
128/1 does not work in the encryption procedure where
(e) ∈ {0, 1} is a parameter defining encryption (e = 0) or decryption (e = 1) mode.
However, it swaps two 64-bit input values in the decryption procedure.















(1 ≤ j ≤ 12), the master key sequences
(K1, K2, K3, K4) are rearranged as specified in Table 3 in which Oi = Ki if e = 0,
O1 = K3, O2 = K4, O3 = K1, O4 = K2 if e = 1 where |Ki| = 64.
To reduce the number of rounds and improve the security of CIKS-128, the block
cipher CIKS-128H, which is a modified version of CIKS-128, is introduced in [20].
The differences between them are the DDP-boxes, the key schedule, and the number
of rounds. First, the CP-boxes Pn/m and P
−1
n/m in CIKS-128 are replaced by the NCE
Rn/m and R
−1
n/m in CIKS-128H, which are constructed by replacing all elementary
switching elements P2/1 with CEs R2/1 that are a nonlinear cryptographic primitive
with a minimum size. Second, CIKS-128H uses 8 rounds less than CIKS-128, since
the differential properties of R2/1 are better than those of P2/1. Finally, CIKS-128H
uses a modified key schedule in which the subkeys are generated as depicted in
Table 4.
4 PROPERTIES OF CIKS-128 AND CIKS-128H
In this section, we describe some properties for components of Crypt(e) of CIKS-
128 and CIKS-128H, which allow us to construct strong related key differential
























































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. Key schedule of CIKS-128H
elements (Properties 1 and 2), which can induce the properties of components of
Crypt(e).
Property 1. Let Pr(CE)(∆Y/∆X,∆V ) be a probability to have the output differ-
ence ∆Y , where CE = P2/1 or R2/1, the input difference is ∆X and the difference
at the controlling input is ∆V . Then we have the following:
1. Pr(P2/1)((0, 0)/(0, 0), 0) = Pr(P2/1)((1, 1)/(1, 1), 0) = 1
2. Pr(P2/1)(∆Y/(0, 0), 1) = Pr(P2/1)(∆Y/(1, 1), 1) = 2
−1 where ∆Y = {(0, 0),
(1, 1)}.
3. Pr(P2/1)(∆Y/∆X,∆V ) = 2
−1 where ∆Y = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}, ∆X = {(0, 1), (1, 0)},
∆V = {0, 1}.
4. Pr(R2/1)((0, 0)/(0, 0), 0) = 1
5. Pr(R2/1)(∆Y/∆X, 1) = 2
−2 for any ∆X, ∆Y .
6. Pr(R2/1)(∆Y1/(0, 1), 0) = Pr(R2/1)(∆Y2/(1, 0), 0) = Pr(R2/1)(∆Y3/(1, 1), 0) = 2
−1
where ∆Y1 = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}, ∆Y2 = {(0, 1), (1, 1)}, ∆Y3 = {(1, 0), (1, 1)}.
The above property is also extended into the following properties.
Property 2. Let Pr(CE)(∆Y/∆X,∆V ) be a probability to have the output differ-




n/m}, the input difference is ∆X and
the difference at the controlling input is ∆V . Then we have the following:
1. Pr(Pn/m)((ej)/(ei), 0) = Pr(P−1n/m)
((ej)/(ei), 0) = 1 for so me i and j (1 ≤ i,
j ≤ n)
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2. Pr(Pn/m)((0)/(0), ei) = Pr(P−1n/m)
((0)/(0), ei) = 2
−1
3. Pr(Rn/m)((0)/(0), ei) = Pr(R−1n/m)
((0)/(0), ei) = 2
−2.
The following two properties are very useful in our key recovery attacks on the
ciphers.
Property 3. Let Pn/m(V )(X) ⊕ Pn/m(V )(X ⊕ ei) = ej for some i and j. Then we
have the following:
1. If n = 8, m = 12 then the exact one difference route from ei to ej via three
P2/1-boxes is fixed. It also holds in P
−1
8/12-box.
2. If n = 64, m = 192 then the exact one difference route from ei to ej via six
P2/1-boxes is fixed. It also holds in P
−1
64/192-box.
Property 4. Let Rn/m(V )(X) ⊕ Rn/m(V )(X ⊕ ei) = ej for some i and j. Then we
have the following:
1. If n = 8, m = 12, i = 8 then the exact one difference route from ei to ej via
three R2/1-boxes is fixed. It also holds in R
−1
8/12-box.
2. If n = 64, m = 192, i = 64 then the exact one difference route from ei to ej via
six R2/1-boxes is fixed. It also holds in R
−1
64/192-box.
For example, consider i = 8 and j = 2 in Property 3-1. Then, we can exactly
know the 3 bits of control vectors (1, 1, 0) corresponding to three elements P2/1-boxes
of P8/12-box with probability 1 (see Figure 3). In Figure 3, the bold line denotes the
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Fig. 3. An example of the difference routes when the input and output differences of P8/12
and P−18/12 are fixed
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Property 5. The following holds for components of Crypt(e) of CIKS-128 and
CIKS-128H.
1. For the control vector V of P64/192-box, π(L, L
′, L′′)⊕π(L, L′⊕e64, L
′′) = e138 and
π(L, L′, L′′)⊕ π(L, L′, L′′ ⊕ e64) = e180. For the control vector V
′ of P−164/192-box,
π(L, L′, L′′)⊕ π(L, L′⊕ e64, L
′′) = e42 and π(L, L
′, L′′)⊕ π(L, L′, L′′⊕ e64) = e20,
where L, L′, L′′ ∈ {0, 1}64 and V, V ′ ∈ {0, 1}192.
2. If L is a random input and A′, A′′ are two random round keys, then GA′A′′(L)⊕
GA′⊕e64A′′⊕e64(L) = 0 or e64, i.e., GA′⊕e64A′′⊕e64(L) = 0 with probability 1/2 and
GA′A′′(L)⊕GA′⊕e64A′′⊕e64(L) = e64 with probability 1/2.
3. For any fixed i, j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ 64), ∆P64/192(∆V =0)(∆X = ei) = ej with probability
2−6. (For any fixed i, j there is one difference route in P64/192(V )(X), and this
route occurs with probability 2−6.) Similarly, it also holds in P−164/192.
4. For any fixed j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ 64), ∆R64/192(∆V =0)(∆X = e64) = ej with probability
2−6 because for any fixed i, j, there is one difference route from e64 to ej in
R64/192(V )(X), and this route occurs with probability 2
−6 by Properties 1-6 and 4.
Similarly, it also holds in R−164/192.
5 RELATED-KEY DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF CIKS-128 AND CIKS-128H
We construct related-key differential characteristics for CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H
using the properties mentioned in the previous subsection.
5.1 Related-Key Differential Characteristic of CIKS-128
As stated above, the key schedule of CIKS-128 is very simple and there are many
useful properties of P64/192 and P
−1
64/192 which allow us to construct good related-key
differential characteristics with high probability.
In this subsection, we show how to construct full-round related-key differential
characteristics for CIKS-128. We consider the situation that we encrypt plaintexts P
and P ′ under an unknown key K and an unknown related-keyK ′ such that P⊕P ′ =
(e64, e64) and K ⊕K
′ = (0, 0, e64, e64), respectively. Then we can obtain 64 desired
full-round related-key differential characteristics (e64, e64) → (0, ej) (1 ≤ j ≤ 64)
with the same probability of 2−42, as depicted in Table 5.
Since we consider a related-key pair (K,K ′) satisfying K ⊕K ′ = (0, 0, e64, e64),
we know the difference form of each round key is satisfied with RK = (0, 0, e64, e64)
or RK = (e64, e64, 0, 0) (Table 3). Now, according to the condition of RK, we
describe one round differential characteristic of Crypt(e) used in our attack.
C1: RK = (0, 0, e64, e64)
If the input difference of Crypt(e) in CIKS-128 is zero, then by Property 5-1, the
output difference of the first π is e180 with probability 1. Thus, by Property 2, the
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output difference of P64/192 is zero with probability S ( = 2
−1) because the input
and controlled vector differences are 0 and e180, respectively. Since the input
and round key differences of the second G are 0 and (e64, e64), respectively, the
corresponding output difference of the second G is 0 with probability T ( = 2−1)
by Property 5-2. Similarly, the output difference of the second π is e42 and the
output difference of P−164/192 is 0 with probability U ( = 2
−1). Hence if the input
difference of Crypt(e) is 0 under RK = (0, 0, e64, e64) then the corresponding
output difference of Crypt(e) is 0 with probability 2−3.
C2: RK = (e64, e64, 0, 0)
Similarly, we can check that the case C2 also holds with probability 2−3.
We alternatively use C1 and C2 to construct the first 11 rounds of our differential
characteristics (see Table 5). In the last round, however, we use a bit different
characteristic from C1 and C2 for our key recovery attack. In Table 5, the case C1’
means that the output difference of the second G in the last round is not zero but
e64 with probability 2
−1, and then by Property 2-2, Property 5-3, and Property 5-2,
we have 2−7(= U) in the last round. See Figure 4.
R (i) ∆RIi ∆RKi S/T/U Pr. Ca.
IT (e64, e64) (e64, e64) · 1 ·
1 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C1
2 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C2
3 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C2
4 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C1
5 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C1
6 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C2
7 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C2
8 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C1
9 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C1
10 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C2
11 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−1/2−1/2−1 2−3 C2
12 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−1/2−1/2−7 2−9 C1’
FT (0, ej ) (0, 0) · 1 ·
Outp. (0, ej ) · · · ·
Total · · · 2−42 ·
- 1 ≤ j ≤ 64: fixed value, Outp.:Output,
- Pr.:Probability, Ca.:Case
Table 5. Related-key differential characteristic of CIKS-128
5.2 Related-Key Differential Characteristic of CIKS-128H
The main difference between CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H is the DDP-box, i.e., CIKS-
128H uses Rn/m-boxes instead of Pn/m-boxes. So, we can similarly present related
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Fig. 4. Propagation of the difference in the last round
key differential characteristics on the full-round CIKS-128H. We first consider the
situation that we encrypt plaintexts P and P ′ under an unknown key K and an un-
known related-key K ′ such that P ⊕ P ′ = (e64, e64) and K ⊕ K
′ = (0, 0, e64, e64),
respectively. Then, we similarly construct the one-round iterative related key dif-
ferential characteristics under the same condition represented in the previous Sub-
section 5.1. The probabilities of C1 and C2 are replaced with 2−5 by Property 1-5,
Property 2-3, and Property 5-2 and then we alternatively use C1 and C2 to con-
struct the first 7 rounds of our differential characteristics (see Table 6). In the last
round, however, we use the case C1’ which means that the output difference of the
second G in the last round is not zero but e64 with probability 2
−1 Property 5-2,
and then by Property 2-3, and Property 5-4, we have the probability of 2−8 ( = U)
in the last round.
Therefore, we can obtain 64 desired full-round related-key differential character-
istics (e64, e64) → (0, ej) (1 ≤ j ≤ 64) with probability 2
−46, as depicted in Table 6.
6 KEY RECOVERY ATTACKS ON CIKS-128 AND CIKS-128H
We now present key recovery attacks on CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H using our related-
key differential characteristics.
To begin with, we encrypt 243 plaintext pairs P = (PL, PR) and P
′ = (PL ⊕
e64, PR⊕e64) under an unknown key K = (K1, K2, K3, K4) and an unknown related-
key K ′ = (K1, K2, K3 ⊕ e64, K4 ⊕ e64), respectively, and then get the 2
43 corre-
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R (i) ∆RIi ∆RKi S/T/U Pr. Ca.
IT (e64, e64) (e64, e64) · 1 ·
1 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−2/2−1/2−2 2−5 C1
2 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−2/2−1/2−2 2−5 C2
3 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−2/2−1/2−2 2−5 C2
4 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−2/2−1/2−2 2−5 C1
5 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−2/2−1/2−2 2−5 C1
6 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−2/2−1/2−2 2−5 C2
7 (0, 0) (e64, e64, 0, 0) 2−2/2−1/2−2 2−5 C2
8 (0, 0) (0, 0, e64, e64) 2−2/2−1/2−8 2−11 C1’
FT (0, ej ) (0, 0) · 1 ·
Outp. (0, ej ) · · · ·
Total · · · 2−46 ·
- 1 ≤ j ≤ 64: fixed value, Outp.:Output,
- Pr.:Probability, Ca.:Case
Table 6. Related-key differential characteristic of CIKS-128H
sponding ciphertext pairs C = (CL, CR) and C
′ = (C ′L, C
′
R), i.e., EK(P ) = C and
EK′(P
′) = C ′, where E is the block cipher CIKS-128. Since our full-round related-
key differential characteristic of CIKS-128 has a probability of 2−42, we expect about
1 ciphertext pair (C,C ′) such that C⊕C ′ = (0, ej) for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ 64). Accord-
ing to our differential trails described in Table 5, we can deduce that the jth one-bit
difference in such (C,C ′) is derived from the 64th input difference of P−164/128 in the
last round (Figure 5). Recall that there is a unique difference route when the input
and output differences with hamming weight 1 are determined in P64/192 and P
−1
64/192.
Then, we can extract 6 bits of control vectors and the corresponding key bits by
using Property 3. Based on this idea we can devise a key recovery attack on the
full-round CIKS-128.
1. For CIKS-128, prepare 243 plaintext pairs (Pi, P
′
i ), i = 1, . . . , 2
43, which have the
(e64, e64) difference. All Pi are encrypted using a master key K and all P
′
i are
encrypted using a master key K ′ where K and K ′ have the (0, 0, e64, e64) differ-
ence. Encrypt each plaintext pair (Pi, P
′




2. Check that Ci ⊕ C
′
i = (0, ej) for each i and j (1 ≤ j ≤ 64).
3. For each ciphertext pair (Ci, C
′
i) passing Step 2, extract some bits of control
vector by chasing a difference route between this PBO and the position of the
64th input bit in P−164/192 (see Figure 5). Then find the corresponding bits of K1,
K1 ⊕K2, and K1 ⊕K3. Note that the controlled vector V
′ of P−164/192 in the last
round is formatted with CL ⊕K1, CL ⊕K1 ⊕K2, and CL ⊕K1 ⊕K3.
The data complexity of this attack is 244 related-key chosen plaintexts. The time
complexity of Step 1 is 244 full-round CIKS-128 encryptions and the time complexity
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Fig. 5. The possible routes of the 64th difference of P−1
64/192
of Steps 2 and 3 is much less than that of Step 1. By our related-key differential
characteristics each ciphertext pair can pass Step 2 with probability at least 2−42
and thus the expectation of ciphertext pair with the (0, ej) difference that pass this
test is at least 2. Therefore we have at least one ciphertext pair with the (0, ej)
difference for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ 64). Thus we can retrieve 56 bits of information of
keys in the lower layer of P−164/192 and 7 bits of information of keys in the upper layer
of P−164/192 with data and a time complexities of 2
44.
Similarly, if we replace 243 related-key plaintext pairs in the above algorithm
by 247 related-key plaintext pairs then we can also succeed in finding 63 bits of
information of keys for CIKS-128H with a time complexity of 248 encryptions. Fur-
thermore, these attacks can be simply extended to retrieve the whole of master key
pair (K,K ′) by performing an exhaustive search for the remaining keys.
7 CONCLUSION
CIKS-128, and CIKS-128H have been designed suitable for intelligent multimedia
and ubiquitous computing systems which require lower power and high-speed per-
formance. They are also considerably resistant against conventional attacks such as
the differential attack and the linear attack. However, they use a weak diffusion,
a weak non-linear operation, and a very simple key schedule, leading to full-round
related-key differential attacks. According to our results, the full-round CIKS-128
and CIKS-128H can be broken by 244 and 248 data/time complexities, respectively.
Our results indicate that CIKS-128 and CIKS-128H are almost in practical attack
bounds.
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